

第 19/2026 號行政長官公告

Aviso do Chefe do Executivo n.º 19/2026

按照中央人民政府的命令，行政長官根據第3/1999號法律《法規的公佈與格式》第六條第一款的規定，命令公佈聯合國安全理事會於二零二五年十二月十二日通過的關於非洲的和平與安全的第2806（2025）號決議的中文和英文正式文本。

二零二六年六月四日發佈。

行政長官 岑浩輝

O Chefe do Executivo manda publicar, nos termos do n.º 1 do artigo 6.º da Lei n.º 3/1999 (Publicação e formulário dos diplomas), por ordem do Governo Popular Central, a Resolução n.º 2806 (2025) relativa à paz e segurança em África, adoptada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas em 12 de Dezembro de 2025, nos seus textos autênticos em línguas chinesa e inglesa.

Promulgado em 4 de Junho de 2026.

O Chefe do Executivo, *Sam Hou Fai*.

第 2806 (2025) 號決議

2025 年 12 月 12 日安全理事會第 10064 次會議通過

安全理事會，

回顧其以往關於索馬里局勢的各項決議和主席聲明，

重申尊重索馬里的主權、領土完整、政治獨立和統一，

讚揚索馬里過去十年來，特別是過去三年在打擊青年黨方面取得的進展，

強調本決議的目的是降低青年黨構成的威脅，

降低青年黨構成的威脅，以及對青年黨實施武器禁運

表示嚴重關切青年黨繼續嚴重威脅索馬里和該區域的和平、安全與穩定，還表示關切與伊黎伊斯蘭國/達伊沙有關聯的分支繼續在索馬里活動，

最強烈地譴責青年黨實施的恐怖主義襲擊，表示深為關切這些襲擊造成的生命損失，還譴責青年黨實行激進化，以追求暴力目標和進行剝削，包括剝削社區錢財，重申安理會決心支持全面努力降低青年黨構成的威脅，

強烈譴責第 2713 (2023) 號決議所設專家小組 (專家小組) 所記錄，包括其最後報告 (S/2025/777) 中所記錄據報青年黨以平民為襲擊目標的行為，以及特別是在人口密集區無差別使用爆炸性武器行為及其對平民造成的後果，

呼籲遵守國際法，表示繼續關切所有違反國際人道法行為，尤其是以平

民為目標、違反與尊重和保護人道主義人員相關義務以及對民用物體實施任何非法攻擊的行為，並繼續關切所有侵犯踐踏人權行為，包括衝突中性暴力和性別暴力行為，特別是與青年黨活動區域販運人口、強迫婚姻和性奴役有關的行為，

表示關切武器和彈藥從也門流向索馬里，違反針對青年黨的軍火禁運，強調必須防止青年黨發展和利用與該地區被列名團體的關係，

回顧 2025 年秘書長關於兒童與武裝衝突問題的報告（S/2025/247），關切地注意到在武裝衝突中違反國際法綁架、招募和使用兒童現象嚴重，幾乎所有招募、使用和綁架兒童案都是青年黨所為，歡迎索馬里國民軍和索馬里國家警察部隊在制止和防止招募及使用兒童方面取得的進展，敦促索馬里聯邦共和國政府（聯邦政府）和索馬里聯邦成員州（聯邦成員州）進一步加強努力，制止和防止秘書長所確定的“六種嚴重侵害”兒童行為，包括依照第 1379（2001）、1998（2011）、2225（2015）和 2467（2019）號決議採取措施，

特別指出，必須根據適用的國際法，採取整個政府和整個社會一體聯動的綜合方針，包括讓索馬里婦女充分、平等、切實、安全地參與並支持她們發揮領導作用，打擊恐怖主義和助長恐怖主義的暴力極端主義，並努力從治理、安全、人權、人道主義、發展和社會經濟各層面應對這個問題，包括解決青年失業和消除貧困，強調必須開展區域和國際合作打擊恐怖主義、切斷恐怖主義資金來源和非法資金流動，發現和防止恐怖分子旅行活動以及制止武器販運，

重申不能也不應將恐怖主義與任何宗教、國籍、文明或族裔群體聯繫在一起，譴責恐怖主義團體企圖通過對宗教的歪曲，編造扭曲性言論，為暴力行為辯護，並鼓吹其破壞索馬里和該區域的企圖，表示關切恐怖主義團

體利用信息和通信技術，包括通過互聯網特別是社交媒體，從事恐怖主義活動，表示支持聯邦政府繼續努力反擊青年黨的言論，強烈鼓勵會員國與聯邦政府合作，防止青年黨利用社交媒體平台進行犯罪，反擊恐怖主義宣傳，

表示嚴重關切索馬里的人道主義局勢，鼓勵各國加大對索馬里的人道主義支持力度，並呼籲衝突各方按照國際法相關規定，特別是適用的國際人道法，並以符合聯合國人道主義緊急援助指導原則（聯合國大會第 46/182 號決議），包括人道、中立、公正和獨立的方式，允許並便利全面、安全、快速、無阻礙地向索馬里各地所有需要幫助的人提供人道主義援助，

確認索馬里、非洲聯盟和在索馬里境內合法開展行動的其他部隊為打擊青年黨以及使索馬里中部地區擺脫青年黨控制，作出了貢獻，而且常常為此付出巨大犧牲，歡迎索馬里和國際社會努力為新解放的社區提供支持和服務以實現穩定，

關切地注意到存在違反安全理事會本決議和以往決議所定措施走私販運武器、軍事裝備和彈藥的現象，敦促聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和會員國採取適當措施，查明走私者並追究其責任，

強調指出，聯邦政府所設中央監測部起着首要作用，在會員國的適當支持和諮詢下，對索馬里各地武器彈藥的交付、標識、流動和審計進行協調、監督、掌控和監測，歡迎中央監測部在這些方面取得的進展，鼓勵索馬里的國際夥伴加強與中央監測部的協調並加強其能力建設，將其作為向索馬里提供武器和彈藥管理援助的主要協調中心，促請聯邦政府通過中央監測部，繼續協調所有與武器和彈藥管理有關的活動，

歡迎聯邦政府在制定火器法案和取締簡易爆炸裝置戰略方面取得進

展，促請聯邦政府按照國際最佳做法，最終完成中央武器許可證審批機關的設立，以加強監督和確保問責，鼓勵索馬里的國際夥伴繼續支持聯邦政府努力加強武器彈藥管理，包括應聯邦政府要求提供技術支持和能力建設，

特別指出需要通過實施定向制裁、防止取得武器彈藥、切斷資金來源、降低簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅、加強海上態勢感知和國際協作，從而削弱青年黨的實力，

確認需要不斷加強正當程序，確保有公正而明確的程序用於把根據經修正的第 1844（2008）號決議指認的個人和實體從名單上刪除，回顧第 2744（2024）號決議獲得通過，強化了除名協調人的任務和程序，

認定青年黨通過包括恐怖主義行為等方式企圖破壞索馬里和該區域的和平與安全，對國際和平與安全構成威脅，

根據《聯合國憲章》第七章採取行動，

A. 定向制裁

1. 回顧安理會規定實施定向制裁的第 1844（2008）號決議以及擴大列名標準的第 2002（2011）、2093（2013）和 2662（2022）號決議，並回顧第 2060（2012）和 2444（2018）號決議各項決定；

2. 回顧第 2664（2022）號決議，其中規定了對資產凍結措施、包括第 1844（2008）號決議第 3 段所定措施的跨領域人道主義豁免；

B. 對青年黨的軍火禁運

3. 回顧所有會員國均應採取必要措施，防止直接或間接地向關於青年黨的第 2713（2023）號決議所設委員會（委員會）根據本決議第 1 段，

指認的實體，即青年黨，供應、出售或轉讓武器和軍事裝備，並防止直接或間接地向其提供與軍事活動有關或與供應、出售、轉讓、製造、保養或使用武器和軍事裝備有關的技術協助或訓練、包括投資在內的資金籌供和其他援助、中介服務或其他金融服務。

4. 歡迎啟動實施更新後的《2025-2030 年索馬里聯邦共和國武器和彈藥管理戰略》，還注意到聯邦政府承諾頒佈法律、法規和行政程序，對常規武器和爆炸物的出口、進口、過境、再轉讓和中介活動進行有效控制，以防止其非法販運和流散，包括確立刑事罪行以遏制和起訴違法行為；

5. 注意到本決議第 36 至 45 段和第 48 段目前規定實行額外控制以防止青年黨獲得武器、彈藥和軍事裝備，以及採取與聯邦成員州有關的措施，表示打算根據本決議第 50 和 51 段所要求的情況報告，在評估確認本決議第 4 段所述法律、法規和行政程序均已確立後，對這些措施進行審查，酌情解除本決議第 36 至 45 段和第 48 段規定的措施，並強調指出必須確保任何此類決定都有助於實現防止所有恐怖團體獲得武器、彈藥和軍事裝備這一目標；

6. 強調指出只有在與聯邦政府協調並事先通知聯邦政府的情況下，才能根據本決議第 41 至 44 段規定的相關程序，經由中央監測部進行適當審查和審議，向聯邦成員州運送一切武器、彈藥和軍事裝備，並注意到中央監測部起着聯邦政府武器彈藥管理協調中心的作用；

7. 歡迎關於對青年黨實施軍火禁運的技術評估報告 (S/2025/673)，讚揚索馬里在武器彈藥和軍事裝備管理、登記和記錄、武器轉讓及軍備控制相關法規以及在努力減少簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅方面取得的進展，認可技術評估的建議，但以現有資源和非索支助和穩定特派團現有任務為限，此外還鼓勵索馬里的國際合作夥伴酌情與相關國際機構協調，支持聯

邦政府努力：

- (a) 實施國家武器彈藥管理戰略和國家反簡易爆炸裝置戰略；
- (b) 制定監管常規武器國際轉讓的總體立法；
- (c) 幫助武器阻斷小組實現目標，包括應對軍火販運方面新威脅；
- (d) 制定程序，以更好地推動在國家武器彈藥管理數據庫中記錄彈藥庫存；
- (e) 建立與海上攔截相關的國家能力；
- (f) 增強國家法證調查能力；

8. 申明聯邦政府應與非洲聯盟支助和穩定特派團（支助和穩定特派團）合作，將所繳獲或查扣的所有青年黨武器、彈藥和軍事裝備登記在國家繳獲武器數據庫中，並在專家小組必要時提供的協助下，調查其來源；

9. 促請會員國採取合理步驟防止向索馬里走私武器和彈藥，還促請會員國酌情通過中央監測部、委員會、專家小組、非索支助和穩定特派團及聯索過渡援助團，與聯邦政府分享涉及從青年黨繳獲武器、彈藥和軍事裝備以及違反對青年黨軍火禁運走私武器彈藥的相關數據；

C. 切斷青年黨的資金來源

10. 關切地注意到青年黨有能力創收和洗錢、儲存和轉移資源，以實施恐怖主義以及破壞索馬里和該區域的穩定，請聯邦政府酌情與國際夥伴合作，繼續制定並實施一項全面、協調的計劃，扼制青年黨的金融活動；

11. 促請聯邦政府繼續與聯邦成員州、索馬里金融管理局、私營部門金融機構和國際社會合作，以便：

(a) 通過改進反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為的標準和準則以及更妥善遵守法律框架，包括與所指定非金融企業和行業有關的法律框架，確定、評估和減輕洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為風險；

(b) 加強在各金融機構及所指定非金融企業和行業監督和遵守反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法規和標準，包括與了解客戶和客戶盡職調查程序以及按照《反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法》（2016 年）以及《移動貨幣條例》（2019 年）、《定向金融制裁法》（2023 年）和金融行動任務組相關建議報告可疑交易有關的法規和標準，鼓勵與電信部門開展協作以減少青年黨利用移動貨幣的風險；

(c) 繼續建設性地參與正在進行的中東和北非金融行動特別工作組的互評，包括安排現場評估，以便在恐怖主義融資和洗錢風險所涉優先領域保持進展；

(d) 優先繼續開發一個安全、包容、能改善金融准入的國家身份識別系統，同時打擊資助恐怖主義行為；

(e) 改進對洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為的監測、報告和調查，包括繼續建設各執法機構的金融犯罪調查能力以及強化機構間協調與合作；

(f) 制定一項計劃，以降低青年黨對國家主管當局和私營部門內從事反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為相關工作的人員構成的風險，並制定一項計劃，以保護那些提供與青年黨勒索手段有關信息的人；

12. 請聯邦政府、專家小組和聯合國相關實體繼續交換有關青年黨活動的信息，並在國際社會的支持下執行一項全面、協調的行動計劃，扼制青年黨活動和阻止其不當利用合法金融系統，加強執行《強化機構間合作以打擊非法貿易和消除其影響路線圖》草案，並制定一項計劃以阻斷使青

年黨得以從中獲利的非法貿易；

13. 鼓勵繼續在區域和國際層面開展合作，應對青年黨對索馬里和該區域構成的威脅，包括繼續支持索馬里努力應對洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為風險，還鼓勵與聯合國相關機構開展國際合作，支持區域各國努力打擊恐怖主義和助長恐怖主義的暴力極端主義；

D. 木炭禁令

14. 重申安理會第 2036 (2012) 號決議第 22 段和第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 11 至 21 段所述關於禁止索馬里木炭進出口的決定；

15. 歡迎聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和各會員國為減少索馬里木炭出口而採取的措施，重申必須努力監測和阻斷索馬里木炭進出口，鼓勵索馬里在其他夥伴酌情提供的支持下繼續確保國內木炭生產的可持續管理；

E. 降低簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅

16. 歡迎聯邦政府實施《2025-2030 年國家反簡易爆炸裝置戰略》，並鼓勵予以全面執行；

17. 回顧依照國家反簡易爆炸裝置戰略，如果有足夠證據表明本決議附件 B 第一部分所列物項將用於或非常有可能用於在索馬里製造簡易爆炸裝置，所有國家均應防止所涉物項從本國領土或由境外本國國民或使用懸掛本國國旗的船隻或飛機直接或間接向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓；

18. 重申：

(a) 在向索馬里轉讓附件 B 第一部分所列任何物項之前，供應物項的會員國應通知索馬里政府，讓其知悉；

(b) 如果根據第 18 段向索馬里直接或間接出售、供應或轉讓附件 B

第一部分所列物項，供應國應在出售、供應或轉讓完成後不超過 15 個工作日通知聯邦政府，讓其知悉，隨後聯邦政府應在 15 個工作日內通知委員會，強調指出，根據本段發出的通知必須包含所有相關信息，包括：

- (一) 物項的使用目的；
- (二) 最終用戶；
- (三) 規格；
- (四) 物項數目；
- (五) 預定儲存地點；

19. 促請會員國支持聯邦政府實施適當立法，對附件 B 第一和第二部分所列物項的進口和過境進行規範和監測；

20. 促請會員國採取適當措施，推動那些參與向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓可能用於製造簡易爆炸裝置的炸藥前體或材料（除其他外包括附件 B 第二部分所列物項）的本國國民、受本國管轄者和在本國領土註冊公司或受本國管轄的公司保持警惕，記錄交易，並與索馬里、委員會和專家小組分享關於索馬里人購買或打探此類化學品的可疑活動信息，確保索馬里得到適足的財政和技術援助，用於為相關材料的儲存和分配建立適當的安全保障；

21. 鼓勵索馬里的國際和區域合作夥伴為爆炸物處理單位開展持續專業培訓，提供適當的設備並協調支持，使索馬里更有能力分析爆炸物以及追蹤簡易爆炸裝置及其部件來源和保管鏈；

F. 海上攔截和海上態勢感知

22. 決定將第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 15 和 17 段所述、經第 2607

(2021) 號決議第 5 段擴展至簡易爆炸裝置部件、最近一次經第 2776 (2025) 號決議第 23 段延長的各项規定延長至 2026 年 11 月 30 日；

23. 申明本決議第 22 段延長的海上攔截和海上態勢感知措施不得以其他方式妨礙索馬里酌情與會員國簽訂海上安全合作雙邊協議的主權權利；

24. 鼓勵有能力的會員國及區域和國際組織應聯邦政府的請求給予支持：

(a) 加強其海上態勢感知和執法，所涉範圍包括漁船在販運和非法貿易中的作用以及對青年黨提供支持的合法和非法貨物海上運輸；

(b) 通過擴大能力建設，改進港口執法和反走私；

25. 表示打算審查並修訂本決議中關於海上攔截和海上態勢感知的各項規定，並至遲於 2026 年 11 月 30 日就延長或修改這些規定採取適當行動；

G. 專家小組和安全理事會委員會

26. 決定續設專家小組，任期從本決議通過之日起至 2026 年 12 月 31 日，最多由 5 名成員組成，在對任務執行和行政要求作適當考慮情況下擇地辦公，任務如下：

(a) 執行本決議第 8 和 12 段所述任務；

(b) 協助委員會監測本決議第 1、3、14、17、18、20、22 和 36 段所詳列措施的執行情況，包括上報任何違規行為信息；

(c) 就如何支持聯邦政府減少武器彈藥走私向委員會提出建議；

(d) 就如何按照 S/2024/751 號文件所述，應對衝突中性暴力問題以及秘書長所指認“六種嚴重侵害”兒童行為，向委員會提出建議；

(e) 調查青年黨獲取組件用於製造簡易爆炸裝置的情況；

(f) 調查青年黨獲取及使用武器、彈藥和軍事裝備（包括簡易爆炸裝置）的情況以及軍火器走私方面的新威脅，並與委員會密切合作提出改進本決議總體遵守情況的措施建議；

(g) 與聯合國相關實體協調，調查青年黨為創造收入而開展的所有活動，包括以木炭作為收入來源；

(h) 調查青年黨的組織結構，包括其高級領導結構以及招募和培訓方法；

(i) 在其提交委員會的報告中納入與有可能根據本決議第 1 段予以指認的個人和實體的任何相關信息，以備安理會將來可能採取措施；

(j) 協助委員會編制列名理由簡述，以便在根據本決議第 1 段指認的個人和實體被列入名單後，在委員會網站上公佈；

27. 請秘書長按照第 2467 (2019) 號決議第 11 段，在專家小組中配備專門的相關專家能力，還請專家小組在其調查和報告工作的所有各方面運用這一專家能力；

28. 回顧會員國與專家小組充分合作的重要性，請聯邦政府協助專家小組對被拘留的青年黨嫌疑成員和其他涉案人進行約談，強調專家小組必須按照 S/2006/997 號文件執行任務；

29. 再次請會員國及非索支助和穩定特派團向專家小組提供信息，協助專家小組開展調查；

(a) 請聯邦政府根據專家小組向其提出的書面請求，為專家組提供便利，讓其查看軍械庫、索馬里國民軍各區軍事儲存設施以及索馬里保管的收繳武器，並協助對索馬里保管的武器彈藥進行拍照以及查閱航行日誌和分發記錄；

(b) 鼓勵專家小組就第 29 (a) 段內容與中央監測部密切協調合作；

(c) 敦促聯邦政府、非索支助和穩定特派團及其合作夥伴與專家小組分享與青年黨的行為或活動有關的信息，特別是資金、木炭、武器、彈藥和軍事裝備非法流動的信息，如果所涉行為或活動屬於定向制裁列名標準的範圍；

(d) 鼓勵專家小組按照 S/2006/997 號文件和本決議第 26 段所述任務，在適當顧及其公正和保密義務的情況下，定期與聯邦政府接觸；

(e) 敦促聯邦政府提供便利，支持專家小組執行任務，協助專家小組與有關當局進行接觸，包括與第 29 (c) 段有關的接觸；

(f) 鼓勵會員國與專家小組接觸並分享有關以宣傳、資助、招募、物資支持和其他方式支持青年黨的個人的信息；

30. 鼓勵索馬里、會員國以及區域和次區域組織定期就制裁制度的執行和監測向委員會提供投入，強調涉及與專家小組合作和接觸的框架的請求應向委員會提出；

31. 請負責兒童與武裝衝突問題秘書長特別代表和負責衝突中性暴力問題特別代表根據第 1960 (2010) 號決議第 7 段、第 1998 (2011) 號決議第 9 段和第 2467 (2019) 號決議第 12 段與聯邦政府和委員會分享相關信息，邀請聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處酌情與聯邦政府和委員會分享相關信息，並邀請兒童與武裝衝突問題工作組酌情向委員會書面通報與第

2093 (2013) 號決議第 43 (e) 段有關的信息；

32. 請專家小組提供：

(a) 在適當時與被任命協助其他制裁委員會和相關聯合國實體工作的獨立專家合作，定期向委員會通報最新情況，包括提供相關的調查詳情以及至遲於 2026 年 6 月 30 日提交一份專題報告；

(b) 全面通報中期最新情況；

(c) 至遲於 2026 年 10 月 31 日通過委員會提交最後報告，供安全理事會審議；

並敦促專家小組就其報告所載結論徵求委員會的反饋意見；

33. 請專家小組在其報告中納入有關青年黨使用木炭作為收入來源的最新具體情況；

34. 決定第 2713 (2023) 號決議所設委員會主席應在 2026 年 11 月 30 日之前並且每年向安全理事會通報情況；

35. 表示打算至遲於 2026 年 11 月 30 日審查專家小組的任務，並就是否延長和調整這一任務採取適當行動；

H. 防止青年黨獲得武器、彈藥和軍事裝備

36. 重申第 2776 (2025) 號決議第 4 段；

37. 鼓勵聯邦政府與委員會分享將獲准進口靜態和移動保護所需武器、彈藥以及軍事裝備的索馬里境內持證私營保安公司名單；

38. 強調索馬里享有根據本決議管制武器、彈藥和軍事裝備入境的主權權利，並鼓勵聯邦政府確保在索馬里境內開展業務的私營保安公司在進

□ 武器、彈藥和軍事裝備之前獲得聯邦政府的必要批准；

39. **重申**第 36 段提到的措施不適用於僅供支持下列實體或供其使用的武器、彈藥或軍事裝備：

- (a) 聯邦政府；
- (b) 索馬里國民軍；
- (c) 國家情報與安全局；
- (d) 國家警察部隊；
- (e) 索馬里看守部隊；

40. **重申**第 36 段提到的措施不適用於僅供支持下列實體或供其使用的武器、彈藥或軍事裝備：

- (a) 聯合國人員，包括聯索過渡援助團和聯索支助辦；
- (b) 非索支助和穩定特派團以及其部隊和警察派遣國；
- (c) 歐洲聯盟培訓和支助活動、土耳其、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國和美利堅合眾國以及與聯邦政府訂有部隊地位協定或諒解備忘錄的任何其他會員國部隊，但它們須告知委員會存在此種協定，進行報備；

41. **決定**，在向聯邦成員州或向本決議第 37 段要求的名單所界定的索馬里境內持證私營保安公司運送本決議附件 A 所列物項以便支持聯邦成員州和持證私營保安公司打擊青年黨或為索馬里境內國際和商業房地及人員提供安保之前，必須與聯邦政府協調，且按照本決議第 43 段所定程序，委員會在接到通知後五個工作日內未作出反對決定；

42. **決定**，在向聯邦成員州或向本決議第 37 段要求的名單所界定的索

馬里境內持證私營保安公司運送所有本決議附件 A 未涵蓋武器彈藥和軍事裝備以便支持聯邦成員州和持證私營保安公司打擊青年黨或為索馬里境內國際和商業房地及人員提供安保之前，必須與聯邦政府協調，且須按照本決議第 43 段所定程序提，前至少五個工作日通知委員會，進行報備；

43. **重申**所有通知均應包括：

(a) 武器彈藥和軍事裝備的生產商和供應商的詳細情況，包括類型、批/次和序列號；

(b) 武器彈藥的說明，包括類別、口徑和數量；

(c) 擬議的交付日期和地點；

(d) 與預定收貨單位或預定存放地點相關的所有信息；

44. **決定**，在向聯邦成員州或向索馬里境內持證私營保安公司運送任何武器彈藥和軍事裝備以便支持聯邦成員州和持證私營保安公司打擊青年黨或為索馬里境內國際和商業房地及人員提供安保之前，提供此類物項的會員國應通知聯邦政府，以便進行適當審查和考慮，注意到中央監測部起着聯邦政府武器彈藥管理協調中心的作用，強調索馬里享有根據本決議管制武器、彈藥和軍事裝備入境的主權權利，並申明聯邦政府負有首要責任，需依照第 41 和 42 段，在接獲提供武器、彈藥和軍事裝備的會員國的通知後五個工作日內，向委員會通報此類物項運入索馬里的任何情況；

45. **重申**，為進一步避免青年黨獲得武器和彈藥，不得將根據本決議第 39、40、41 和 42 段出售或供應的武器、彈藥和軍事裝備轉售、轉讓或提供給任何並非為最初出售或供應對象，或並非為出售國或供應國服務，或並非為國際、區域或次區域組織服務的個人或實體，請委員會與中央監測部和國家安全辦公室分享提交給委員會的與第 41 和 42 段有關的所有通

知，供其參考；

46. 請委員會與聯邦政府合作，編擬、製作和散發根據第 18 (b)、41、42 和 44 段向委員會發送通知的模板；

47. 請秘書處在其現有資源範圍內支持聯邦政府開展與武器彈藥和相關物資管制有關的宣傳工作，必要時使用當地語言；

48. 重申第 36 段所述措施不適用於：

(a) 由聯合國人員、媒體代表、私營保安承包商以及人道主義和發展工作者及相關人員臨時出口到索馬里、僅供個人使用的防護服，包括防彈背心和軍用頭盔；

(b) 國家或國際、區域或次區域組織僅為人道主義或保護目的運送非致命性軍事裝備；

(c) 運載防衛用途武器和軍事裝備的船隻在索馬里港口臨時停靠，前提是此類物項必須始終留在船上；

I. 報告

49. 請聯邦政府在通過國家安全架構各機構和索馬里安全發展計劃進行協商後，至遲於 2026 年 5 月 31 日、其後至遲於 2026 年 10 月 31 日向安全理事會提交報告，內容包括：

(a) 說明現有為確保武器、彈藥和軍事裝備的安全儲存、登記、維護和分發而建立的基礎設施，並說明這方面的任何能力建設需求；

(b) 說明登記、分發、使用和儲存武器的現行程序和行為守則以及這方面的任何能力建設需求；

(c) 附有第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 7 段和第 2551 (2020) 號決議第 37 段所要求的聯合核查小組報告；

(d) 概述國內金融機構記錄的可疑活動以及金融報告中心為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而開展的調查和採取的行動最新情況，同時應保護敏感信息的機密性；

(e) 關於索馬里為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而採取具體行動的最新情況；

50. 請聯邦政府在本決議第 49 段要求的第二次報告中，進一步載述《國家武器和彈藥管理戰略》的最新執行情況，包括在制定和實施本決議第 4 段所述法律、法規和行政程序方面取得的進展；

51. 請秘書長與聯邦政府，酌情與相關聯合國實體以及與其他相關利益攸關方進行協商，最遲於 2026 年 10 月 31 日向安全理事會提交一份關於對青年黨實施軍火禁運的技術評估報告，包括提供關於 S/2025/673 號文件所述關鍵領域的進一步新信息，並提出適當具體建議；

52. 請本決議第 40 (c) 段所列或隨後增列的組織和國家至遲於 2026 年 10 月 31 日向安全理事會以及向中央監測部和國家安全辦公室提供自本決議通過以來向索馬里提供支持的最新情況，並詳細說明本報告所述期間進口的武器、彈藥和軍事裝備；

53. 決定繼續積極處理此案。

附件 A

須經無異議程序的物項¹

1. 地對空導彈，包括便攜式防空導彈系統（肩扛式防空導彈）；
2. 口徑大於 12.7 毫米的武器和專門為這些武器設計的部件，以及相關彈藥；

(a) 註：這不包括肩射反坦克火箭發射器，例如火箭榴彈或輕型反坦克武器、無後坐力炮、槍榴彈或榴彈發射器；

3. 口徑大於 82 毫米的迫擊炮及相關彈藥；
4. 反坦克制導武器，包括反坦克制導導彈和彈藥以及專門為這些物項設計的部件；
5. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的火藥和裝置；地雷和相關材料；引信；
6. 有夜視功能（包括熱成像和紅外線）的武器瞄準具以及配件；
7. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的固定翼、轉動翼、傾斜旋翼或傾斜翼飛機；
8. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的“載體”和兩棲車輛；

(a) 註：“載體”包括任何船舶、表面效應運載工具、小水平面面積的船隻或水翼船以及船隻的船體或船體一部分；

9. 無人駕駛作戰飛機（在聯合國常規武器登記冊中列為第四類）。

¹（不適用於索馬里聯邦共和國政府、索馬里國民軍、索馬里國家情報與安全局、索馬里國家警察部隊和索馬里看守部隊）。

附件 B

簡易爆炸裝置組件

爆炸材料、炸藥前體、爆炸相關設備和相關技術

第一部分¹

1. 下列爆炸材料和前體以及含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料和前體的混合物：

- (a) 硝化棉（含氮量大於 12.5%w/w）；
- (b) 三硝基苯基甲硝胺；
- (c) 硝酸甘油（但按藥用劑量單個包裝/配製的情況除外）；
- (d) 硝酸；
- (e) 硫酸；

2. 爆炸相關物品：

(a) 專門設計用於通過電氣或非電氣方式引爆炸藥的設備和裝置（例如點火裝置、引爆裝置、點火器、導爆索）；

(b) 第 1 和 2(a) 段所列物項的“生產”或“使用”所需“技術”；

第二部分

1. 下列爆炸材料以及含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料的混合物：

¹ 須在計劃裝運前通知索馬里聯邦共和國政府。

- (a) 硝銨燃油炸藥（銨油炸藥）；
 - (b) 硝酸乙二醇；
 - (c) 季戎四醇四硝酸酯；
 - (d) 三硝基氯苯；
 - (e) 2，4，6-三硝基甲苯（梯恩梯）；
2. 炸藥前體：
- (a) 硝酸銨；
 - (b) 硝酸鉀；
 - (c) 氯酸鈉；
3. 專家小組認定的雙重用途物項：
- (a) 帶有擾動傳感器的警報系統，包括摩托車警報器；
4. 學習代碼接收器。

Resolution 2806 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10064th meeting, on 12 December 2025

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Commending the progress made in Somalia over the past ten years, and especially over the past three years in the fight against Al-Shabaab,

Emphasising that the purpose of this resolution is to degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

Degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and the Arms Embargo targeting Al-Shabaab

Expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and *further expressing* concern about the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh,

Condemning in the strongest possible terms Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks, *expressing* deep concern at the loss of life from these attacks, *further condemning* Al-Shabaab's radicalisation to violent ends and exploitation, including financially of communities, and *reiterating* its determination to support comprehensive efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

Strongly condemning the reported targeting of civilians by Al-Shabaab as well as its indiscriminate use of explosive weapons, in particular in densely populated areas, and the consequences for the civilian population, as recorded by the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) (Panel), including in its final report (S/2025/777),

Calling for compliance with international law, and *expressing* continued concern about all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the targeting of civilians, violations of obligations related to the respect and protection of humanitarian personnel, and any unlawful attacks against civilian objects, and all violations and abuses of human rights, including those involving sexual and gender-

based violence in conflict, especially as related to trafficking in persons, forced marriage and sexual slavery in areas where Al-Shabaab is present,

Expressing concern about the flow of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab, and *emphasising* the importance of preventing Al-Shabaab from developing and exploiting a relationship with listed groups in the region,

Recalling the 2025 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2025/247), *noting* with concern the high levels of abduction and recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, with almost all instances of recruitment and use and abduction of children attributed to Al-Shabaab, *welcoming* the progress made by the Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali National Police Force (SNPF) towards ending and preventing the recruitment and use of children and *urging* the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia (GFRS) and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS) to further strengthen efforts to end and prevent the "six grave violations" against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolutions 1379 (2001), 1998 (2011), 2225 (2015) and 2467 (2019),

Underscoring the importance of a holistic, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, including the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation and support for leadership roles of women in Somalia, to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, human rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic dimensions of the problem, including youth unemployment and poverty, and *emphasising* the importance of regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism, disrupt terrorist finances and illicit financial flows, detect and prevent terrorist travel, and stop arms trafficking,

Reiterating that terrorism cannot, and should not, be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, *condemning* terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives that are based on misrepresentation of religion to justify violence and to popularise their attempts to undermine Somalia and the region, *expressing* concern over their exploitation of information and communication technologies including through the Internet, particularly social media, for terrorist purposes, *supporting* the GFRS's renewed efforts to counter Al-Shabaab's narratives, and *strongly encouraging* Member States to work with the GFRS to prevent Al-Shabaab from using social media platforms for criminal purposes and to counter terrorist propaganda,

Expressing serious concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *encouraging* States to scale-up their humanitarian support to Somalia, and *calling for* all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, particularly applicable international humanitarian law, and in a manner consistent with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance (United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182), including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access to all persons in need across Somalia,

Recognising the contribution of Somali, African Union, and other forces operating legally in Somalia towards combatting Al-Shabaab, often at great sacrifice, and liberating areas of central Somalia from Al-Shabaab, and *welcoming* Somali and international efforts to bring stabilisation support and services to newly liberated communities,

Noting with concern smuggling and trafficking of weapons, military equipment and ammunition in contravention of the measures imposed by the Security Council in

this and previous resolutions, and *urging* the GFRS, FMS and Member States to take appropriate measures to identify smugglers and hold them accountable,

Stressing the primary role of the Central Monitoring Department (CMD), established by the GFRS to provide coordination, oversight, assurance and monitoring of the delivery, marking, circulation and audit of weapons and ammunition across Somalia, with support and advice from Member States, *welcoming* the progress made by the CMD in this area, *encouraging* Somalia's international partners to strengthen coordination with and capacity-building to the CMD as the primary focal point for weapons and ammunition management assistance to Somalia, and *calling on* the GFRS to continue coordinating all activities related to weapons and ammunition management through the CMD,

Welcoming the progress made by the GFRS in developing the firearms bill and the counter-improvised explosive device strategy, *calling on* the GFRS to finalise the establishment of a centralised licensing authority for weapons, in accordance with international best practices, to strengthen oversight and ensure accountability, and *encouraging* Somalia's international partners to continue to support the GFRS's efforts to strengthen weapons and ammunition management, including through technical support and capacity building, as requested by the GFRS,

Underscoring the need to degrade Al-Shabaab through targeted sanctions, preventing access to weapons and ammunition, disrupting its finances, reducing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, improving maritime domain awareness and international collaboration,

Recognising the need to continuously strengthen due process and to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for delisting individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) as amended, and *recalling* the adoption of resolution 2744 (2024) enhancing the mandate and procedure of the Focal Point for Delisting,

Determining that Al-Shabaab's attempts to undermine peace and security in Somalia and the region, including through acts of terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

A. Targeted sanctions

1. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008), which imposed targeted sanctions, and its resolutions 2002 (2011), 2093 (2013) and 2662 (2022), which expanded the listing criteria, and *recalls* its decisions in resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018);

2. *Recalls* resolution 2664 (2022), which established a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freeze measures, including those imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008);

B. Arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab

3. *Recalls* that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical assistance or training, financial and other assistance including investment, brokering or other financial services, related to military activities or to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of weapons and military equipment, to Al-Shabaab, as an entity designated pursuant to

paragraph 1 of this resolution by the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab (Committee);

4. *Welcomes* the launch of the updated Weapons and Ammunition Management Strategy of the Federal Republic of Somalia 2025-2030, and *further notes* the GFRS's commitment to enact laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export, import, transit, re-transfer and brokering in conventional weapons and explosives in order to prevent illicit trafficking and diversion, including the establishment of criminal offences to deter and prosecute violations;

5. *Notes* paragraphs 36 to 45 and 48 of this resolution, which currently impose additional controls to prevent Al-Shabaab from gaining access to weapons, ammunition and military equipment as well as measures pertaining to the FMS, *expresses* its intention to review these measures, informed by the reporting requested in paragraphs 50 and 51 of this resolution, and, upon its assessment that the laws, regulations and administrative procedures referred to in paragraph 4 of this resolution have been established, to, as appropriate, lift the measures in paragraphs 36 to 45 and 48 of this resolution, and *stresses* the importance of ensuring any such decision supports the objective of preventing all terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons, ammunition and military equipment;

6. *Stresses* that deliveries of all weapons, ammunition and military equipment to FMS may only be provided in coordination with and with prior notification to the GFRS, through the CMD to allow for appropriate review and consideration, in line with the relevant procedures set out in paragraphs 41 to 44 of this resolution, and *notes* the CMD's role as the focal point for the GFRS on weapons and ammunition management;

7. *Welcomes* the technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab (S/2025/673), *commends* Somalia for the progress made on the management, registration and documentation of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment, the transfer of arms and regulations related to arms control, and efforts to reduce the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices, *endorses* the technical assessment's recommendations, within existing resources and AUSSOM's existing mandate, and further *encourages* Somalia's international partners, in coordination with relevant international agencies, as appropriate, to support the GFRS in its efforts to:

- a. implement the National Weapons and Ammunition Management strategy and the National Counter-IED strategy;
- b. develop overarching legislation regulating international transfers of conventional arms;
- c. enable the delivery of the Arms Disruption Cell's objectives, including on emerging threats in arms trafficking;
- d. develop procedures to better facilitate the recording of ammunition stocks in the National WAM Database;
- e. develop national capacity related to maritime interdiction; and,
- f. enhance national forensic investigations capacity;

8. *Affirms* that the GFRS, in cooperation with the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM), shall register all weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured or seized from Al-Shabaab in the National Captured Weapons Database and, with the assistance of the Panel as necessary, investigate their origin;

9. *Calls on* Member States to take reasonable steps to prevent smuggling of weapons and ammunition into Somalia and *further calls on* Member States to share data with the GFRS, through the CMD, the Committee, the Panel, AUSSOM and UNTMIS, as appropriate, regarding weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured from Al-Shabaab and the smuggling of weapons and ammunition in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab;

C. Disrupting Al-Shabaab's finances

10. *Notes* with concern Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources to carry out terrorism and destabilise Somalia and the region, and *requests* the GFRS, working with international partners as appropriate, to continue to develop and implement a comprehensive and coordinated plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's financial operations;

11. *Calls upon* the GFRS to continue working with the FMS, Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to:

a. identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks by improving anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards, guidance, and compliance with legal frameworks, including those pertaining to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP);

b. strengthen supervision of, and compliance with, AML and CFT regulations and standards across financial institutions and DNFBPs, including as related to Know Your Customer and customer due diligence procedures and suspicious transaction reporting in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016), as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019), Targeted Financial Sanctions Act (2023) and relevant Financial Action Task Force recommendations, and encourage collaboration with the telecoms sector to reduce the risk of exploitation of the mobile money sector by Al-Shabaab;

c. continue constructive engagement with the ongoing Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation (MENAFATF) process, including scheduling an onsite evaluation to maintain progress on priority areas relating to terrorist financing and money laundering risks;

d. prioritise the continued development of a secure and inclusive national identification system that improves financial access while countering the financing of terrorism;

e. improve monitoring, reporting and investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing, including continuing to build financial crime investigative capacity across law enforcement agencies and enhancing inter-agency coordination and collaboration; and,

f. develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in AML and CFT roles within national competent authorities and the private sector, and a plan to protect those who share information relating to Al-Shabaab's extortion tactics;

12. *Requests* the GFRS, the Panel and relevant UN entities to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's operations and, with support from the international community, implement a comprehensive and coordinated action plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations and exploitation of the licit financial system, strengthen implementation of the draft Roadmap for Enhanced Inter-Agency

Cooperation to Combat Illicit Trade and its Effects and develop a plan to disrupt all illicit trade from which Al-Shabaab profits;

13. *Encourages* continued cooperation at the regional and international level to address the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the region including continued support to Somalia's efforts to address money laundering and terrorist financing risks, and *further encourages* international cooperation with relevant UN agencies supporting regional countries in their efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;

D. Charcoal Ban

14. *Reaffirms* its decision to ban the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014);

15. *Welcomes* measures taken by the GFRS, FMS and Member States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, *reaffirms* the importance of the efforts to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *encourages* Somalia to continue to ensure the sustainable management of domestic charcoal production, with support from other partners, as appropriate;

E. Reducing the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

16. *Welcomes* the GFRS's adoption of the National Counter-IED Strategy 2025-2030 and *encourages* its full implementation;

17. *Recalls* that, in line with the National Counter-IED Strategy, all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in Part I of Annex B to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk exists that they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

18. *Reaffirms* that:

a. prior to transferring any items in Part I of Annex B to Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items shall notify the GFRS for its awareness;

b. where an item in Part I of Annex B is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 18, the supplying State shall notify the GFRS for its awareness of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and that the GFRS shall subsequently notify the Committee within 15 working days, and *stresses* the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including:

- i. purpose of the use of the item(s);
- ii. end user;
- iii. specifications;
- iv. quantity of the item(s); and,
- v. intended storage location;

19. *Calls upon* Member States to support the GFRS in implementing appropriate legislation to regulate and monitor the import and transit of items listed in Parts I and II of Annex B;

20. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including, among other things, items in Part II of Annex B, to keep records of transactions and share information with Somalia, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that Somalia is provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

21. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives and tracing the origin and chain of custody of IEDs and their components;

F. Maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness

22. *Decides* to renew, until 30 November 2026, the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 2182 (2014), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution 2607 (2021) to cover IED components, as most recently renewed by paragraph 23 of resolution 2776 (2025);

23. *Affirms* that the maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness measures renewed by paragraph 22 of this resolution do not otherwise hinder the sovereign right of Somalia to enter into bilateral agreements with Member States on maritime security cooperation;

24. *Encourages* Member States and regional and international organisations that have the capacity to do so to support the GFRS, at its request, to:

a. strengthen its maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade and maritime movements of licit and illicit goods that lend support to Al-Shabaab; and,

b. improve law enforcement and counter-smuggling at ports, through the extension of capacity-building;

25. *Expresses* its intention to review and revise the provisions in this resolution on maritime interdictions and maritime domain awareness and take appropriate action regarding extension or modification of these provisions, no later than 30 November 2026;

G. Panel of Experts and Security Council Committee

26. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution until 31 December 2026, the Panel, to consist of up to 5 members, appropriately located with due consideration for mandate implementation and administrative requirements, with the following mandate:

- a. to conduct the tasks referred to in paragraphs 8 and 12 of this resolution;
 - b. to assist the Committee in monitoring the implementation of the measures detailed in paragraphs 1, 3, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22 and 36 of this resolution, including by reporting any information on violations;
 - c. to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the GFRS in reducing the smuggling of weapons and ammunition,
 - d. to give recommendations to the Committee on how to address sexual violence in conflict and the “six grave violations” against children as identified by the Secretary-General, in line with S/2024/751;
 - e. to investigate Al-Shabaab’s acquisition of components used in the manufacture of IEDs;
 - f. to investigate Al-Shabaab’s access to and use of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including IEDs, and emerging threats in arms smuggling, and work closely with the Committee on recommendations for measures to improve overall compliance with this resolution;
 - g. to investigate, in coordination with relevant UN entities, all activities used by Al-Shabaab to generate revenues, including the use of charcoal as a revenue source;
 - h. to investigate the organisational structure of Al-Shabaab, including its senior leadership structures, as well as its methods of recruitment and training;
 - i. to include in its reports to the Committee any information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution for possible future measures by the Council; and,
 - j. to assist the Committee in compiling narrative summaries of reasons for listing, to be made accessible on the Committee’s website, after individuals and entities designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution are added to the list;
27. *Requests* the Secretary-General to include relevant dedicated expertise on the Panel in line with paragraph 11 of resolution 2467 (2019) and *further requests* the Panel to apply this expertise across all aspects of its investigations and reporting;
28. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between Member States and the Panel, *requests* the GFRS to facilitate for the Panel interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, and *stresses* the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997;
29. *Reiterates* its request for Member States and AUSSOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations; and,
- a. *requests* the GFRS to facilitate, on the basis of written requests to the GFRS by the Panel, access for the Panel to armouries, military storage facilities in SNA sectors and captured weaponry in Somali custody, and to facilitate photographs of weapons and ammunition held in Somali custody and access to logbooks and distribution records;
 - b. *encourages* the Panel to coordinate and work closely with the CMD on paragraph 29.a;
 - c. *urges* the GFRS, AUSSOM and partners to share information with the Panel regarding conduct or activities, in particular on illicit flows of finances, charcoal, weapons, ammunition and military equipment by Al-Shabaab, where covered by listing criteria for targeted sanctions;

d. *encourages* the Panel, with due regard for its impartiality and confidentiality obligations, to engage regularly with the GFRS, in line with document S/2006/997 and the mandate in paragraph 26 of this resolution;

e. *urges* the GFRS to facilitate, in support of the implementation of the Panel's mandate, engagement between the Panel and relevant authorities, including as relates to paragraph 29.c; and,

f. *encourages* Member States to engage and share information with the Panel on individuals supporting Al-Shabaab through propaganda, financing, recruitment, materiel support and other means;

30. *Encourages* Somalia, Member States, and regional and subregional organisations to provide regular inputs to the Committee regarding the implementation and monitoring of the sanctions regime, and *stresses* that requests regarding frameworks for cooperation and engagement with the Panel should be directed to the Committee;

31. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010), paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2467 (2019), and *invites* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee, and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to communicate to the Committee pertinent information, in writing, with regard to paragraph 43 (e) of resolution 2093 (2013), as appropriate;

32. *Requests* the Panel to provide:

a. regular updates to the Committee, in collaboration with independent experts appointed to help the work of other sanctions committees and relevant UN entities, as and when appropriate, including detailed investigations where relevant and one thematic report by 30 June 2026;

b. a comprehensive mid-term update; and

c. for the Security Council's consideration through the Committee, a final report by 31 October 2026;

and *urges* the Panel to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;

33. *Requests* the Panel to include in its reporting a specific update on Al-Shabaab's use of charcoal as a revenue source;

34. *Decides* that briefings from the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) to the Security Council shall take place on an annual basis and before 30 November 2026;

35. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of this mandate, no later than 30 November 2026;

H. Preventing Al-Shabaab from accessing weapons, ammunition and military equipment

36. *Reaffirms* paragraph 4 of resolution 2776 (2025);

37. *Encourages* the GFRS to share with the Committee a list of licenced private security companies operating in Somalia that shall be allowed to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment required for static and mobile protection;

38. *Emphasises* Somalia's sovereign right to govern the entry into its territory of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, consistent with this resolution, and encourages the GFRS to ensure that private security companies operating in Somalia obtain requisite approval from the GFRS before importing weapons, ammunition and military equipment;

39. *Reaffirms* that the measures referenced in paragraph 36 do not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

- a. GFRS;
- b. SNA;
- c. NISA;
- d. SNPF; and,
- e. the Somali Custodial Corps;

40. *Reaffirms* that the measures referenced in paragraph 36 shall not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

- a. United Nations personnel, including UNTMIS and UNSOS;
- b. AUSSOM, and the Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries to AUSSOM; and,
- c. European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as any other Member State forces, with a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the GFRS, provided that they inform the Committee, for information purposes only, about the existence of such agreements;

41. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia as defined in the list requested in paragraph 37 of this resolution, for the purpose of supporting the FMS and licensed private security companies in countering Al-Shabaab or to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may only be provided in coordination with the GFRS and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification in accordance with the process set out in paragraph 43 of this resolution;

42. *Decides* that deliveries of all weapons, ammunition and military equipment not covered by Annex A to this resolution to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia as defined in the list requested in paragraph 37 of this resolution, for the purpose of supporting the FMS and licensed private security companies in countering Al-Shabaab or to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may only be provided in coordination with the GFRS and are subject to notification to the Committee, for information only, at least five working days in advance in accordance with the process set out in paragraph 43 of this resolution;

43. *Reaffirms* that all notifications should include:

- a. details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including type, lot/batch and serial numbers;
- b. a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity;
- c. proposed date and place of delivery; and
- d. all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;

44. *Decides* that, prior to delivering any weapons, ammunition and military equipment to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia, for the purpose of supporting the FMS and licensed private security companies in countering Al-Shabaab or to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items shall notify the GFRS to allow for appropriate review and consideration, *notes* the CMD's role as the focal point for the GFRS on weapons and ammunition management, *emphasises* Somalia's sovereign right to govern the entry into its territory of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, consistent with this resolution, and *affirms* that the GFRS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 41 and 42, of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Somalia, within five working days of receiving notification from the supplying Member State;

45. *Reaffirms* that to further avoid Al-Shabaab obtaining weapons and ammunition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 42 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation and *requests* the Committee to share all notifications pertaining to paragraphs 41 and 42 submitted to the Committee with the CMD and the Office of National Security, for their information;

46. *Requests* the Committee, in cooperation with the GFRS, to develop, produce and disseminate templates for notifications to the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 18.b, 41, 42 and 44;

47. *Requests* the Secretariat to support the GFRS' dissemination efforts in relation to the control of arms, ammunition and related materiel in the local language, if necessary, within its existing resources;

48. *Reaffirms* that the measures referenced in paragraph 36 shall not apply to:

- a. supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media, private security contractors and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;
- b. the delivery of non-lethal military equipment by States, or international, regional or subregional organisations intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and
- c. entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;

I. Reporting

49. *Requests* the GFRS, following consultation through the structures of the National Security Architecture and Somali Security Development Plan, to provide to the Security Council, by 31 May 2026 and then by 31 October 2026, reports which include:

a. a description of the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;

b. a description of the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;

c. the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020);

d. an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information; and,

e. an update on specific actions taken to counter the financing of terrorism in Somalia;

50. *Requests* the GFRS, in the second report requested in paragraph 49 of this resolution, to further include an update on implementation of the National Weapons and Ammunition Management strategy, including progress towards the establishment and implementation of the laws, regulations and administrative procedures referred to in paragraph 4 of this resolution;

51. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, by 31 October 2026, a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab, in consultation with the GFRS, relevant UN entities as appropriate and other relevant stakeholders, including further updates on the key areas included in document S/2025/673, with specific recommendations as appropriate;

52. *Requests* the organisations and states listed in paragraph 40.c of this resolution, or subsequently added, to provide to the Security Council, and to the CMD and the Office of National Security, by 31 October 2026, an update on the support provided to Somalia since the adoption of this resolution and detail of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment imported in the reporting period;

53. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex A – Items subject to a no-objection process¹

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;
 - a. Note: This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), recoilless rifles, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers;
3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel; and fuses;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability, including thermal and infrared, and accessories;
7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;
8. ‘Vessels’ and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
 - a. Note: ‘Vessel’ includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel;
9. Uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

¹ (Not applicable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Somali National Army, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Police Force and the Somali Custodial Corps).

Annex B – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components

Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology

Part I¹

1. Explosive materials and precursors, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
 - b. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
 - c. Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);
 - d. Nitric acid;
 - e. Sulphuric acid;
2. Explosive-related goods:
 - a. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord);
 - b. “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paragraphs 1 and 2 (a);

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
 - b. Nitroglycol;
 - c. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - d. Picryl chloride;
 - e. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
2. Explosives precursors:
 - a. Ammonium nitrate;
 - b. Potassium nitrate;
 - c. Sodium chlorate;
3. Dual use items identified by the Panel:
 - a. Alarm systems with disturbance sensors, including motorcycle alarms;
4. Learning code receivers.

¹ To be notified to Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in advance of intended shipment.